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Active Logic and Heim's Rules for Updating Discourse ContextJohn GurneyProcessing and Display DivisionArmy Research Laboratory, Adelphi,MD 20783gurney@aic.nrl.navy.mil Don Perlis and Khemdut PurangDept. of Computer ScienceUniversity of Maryland, College Park,MD 20742fperlis, kpurangg@cs.umd.eduAbstractDiscourse unfolds in time, giving rise to a cas-cade of belief changes in the listener. Yetthis temporal evolution of discourse and be-lief is typically ignored in theoretical treat-ments of discourse. It has been claimed (seeSoames [Soames, 1989]) that Heim's [Heim,1983] theory of discourse context accounts fornon-implicative discourse updating. We willpresent a new non-implicative discourse thatcannot be accounted for with Heim's use ofglobal or local accommodation and which ap-pears to require attention to evolution of dis-course. We use this example to motivate re-making Heim's update function, aimed towarda unied approach to discourse|one in whichHeim's rules for discourse updating can accountfor more of the problem cases for the theory ofdiscourse context. These rules and the revisedupdate function can then serve as principlesthat constrain the building of representationsfor discourse context (such as the DiscourseRepresentation Structures, of Discourse Rep-resentation Theory, [Kamp and Reyle, 1993]).We propose active logic as a convenient tool forexecuting the required inferences (as called forby our revised version of Heim's update func-tion) as the discourse evolves through time.Keywords: presupposition, discourse, context,accommodation, active logic1 Background on active logic andpresupposition.Active logic [Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis, 1990, Perlis andMiller, 1993] is a family of formalisms developed for thepurpose of modeling the reasoning process in a way thatrespects the passage of time as reasoning proceeds. Thatis, the reasoner may have beliefs (draw inferences) con-cerning what time it is (now), and these are updatedduring reasoning since what time it is changes during
reasoning. Moreover, this update is itself reasoned, i.e.,governed by the same inferential processes as the restof the reasoning. These formalisms have been appliedto a number of domains, from multi-agent interaction todeadline-coupled planning, from fully-decidable defaultreasoning to reasoning in the presence of contradictions,from correcting misidentication errors to perceptual ref-erence.Active-logic formalisms can have time-sensitive infer-ence rules. The most obvious case of such a rule isthe \clock-rule": from Now(t) [the time is now t] in-fer Now(t+1) [the time is now t+1] (and do not retainNow(t) as a belief). In such a logic, the update (or truth-maintenance) in which new information is integrated intothe belief base, is not a separate process from the draw-ing of (defeasible) conclusions. Rather than proceedingfrom one nonmonotonic theory (with one set of axioms)to another nomonotonic theory (with an updated set ofaxioms) there is one evolving theory in which the evolu-tion is itself determined by the inference rules. In par-ticular the incorporation of new information is adjudi-cated as an inference process, including the decision asto which \axioms" and \inferences" to retain and whichto reject. It is not assumed that newer information isnecessarily more trustworthy than previous information;this is determined by reasoning with the full benet ofworld-knowledge. Moreover, in active logic the reason-ing is informed by its own temporal history: an inferenceat time t can be made partly on the basis of what hasor has not been inferred at particular past time steps.The above rule for Now-update is the ultimate in non-monotonicity: it undoes its own antecedent! This ruleis also the basis for most of the interesting behaviors ofactive logic: in active-logic inference, what might be in-ferred from B at time t need not be inferred from B attimes t+1 or t 1. Thus in active logic it is possible toinfer, at time t, that Q, given that it is now t (\Now t")and given \Q will be true at time t". Traditional tem-poral logics do not treat the present (now) as a changingentity during reasoning but rather tacitly treat reasoningas occurring in a timeless present; while this may be ap-propriate for some purposes, it does not meet the needsof a reasoner embedded in the world, and particularly of
a participant in a dialog.Here we propose to apply active logic to dialog, and inparticular to presuppositional pragmatic inference. Themotivation for this is in part that in conversation, infor-mation comes in the form of utterances over time, andthus there is no xed axiom set on which to base rea-soning. Rather, as new information comes along (in theform of further utterances) the reasoner-listener must re-vise its beliefs, perhaps retracting some altogether andaltering others. Garden path sentences1 [Crain andSteedman, 1985] are particularly striking examples ofthis, but we think that even ordinary sentences can havesuch eects, as in \My house was never built." Beforethe utterance is fully heard, there is a strong presuppo-sition that my house exists, but this is then denied bythe rest of the sentence. Multi-sentence dialog is evenmore clearly of this sort, as in \The roses are not in thefridge. I did not buy any roses."Traditional studies of presupposition have focused oncharacterizing the \right" nal conclusion (e.g., thatthere are no roses) while paying scant attention to theintermediate processes involved in coming to such a con-clusion. We think that there is much to be gained froma more ne-grained approach, modeling the underlyingstep-by-step reasoning a listener may perform during theunfolding of an ongoing conversation. Active logic seemsto us to be a potentially powerful tool for modeling suchbehavior, allowing contradictory beliefs to trigger rea-soned belief revision.This paper sketches some of our ideas for applying ac-tive logic to presupposition in dialog, with particular at-tention to Heim's treatment of negation. We are broadlysympathetic to Heim's approach; in trying to formalizeit for our purposes we have made a number of obser-vations that have further focused our eorts. One suchis that of multiple presuppositions, only one of which isdefeated by a later utterance, as in \The roses are not inthe fridge. There are no roses." Here an inference to theeect that there are roses and that there is a refrigeratorseems called for by the rst sentence; such an inference ispresuppositional: it appears necessary in order to under-stand the sentence, whether or not the sentence is true; alistener \accommodates" by making these assumptions.But then the second sentence requires us to revoke thepresupposition that there are roses, while leaving intactthe belief that there is a refrigerator.Straightforward application of Heim's rules to such ex-amples appears either to revoke not only the initial pre-supposition that there are roses but also that there is afridge or to revoke neither. An active-logic treatment al-lows us a more ne-grained control over the underlyingtime-situated reasoning in which only the appropriatedefeat is performed. We have devised a number of ac-tive logic inference rules for this purpose, and appliedthem to the above example and others. We are now in1E.g., \The horse raced past the barn fell".
the process of implementing such an active logic theoryof presuppositional defeat, which we hope to report onin another paper.In this paper we will present a treatment of the above\fridge and roses" problem, as a key illustration of ourideas. First however we provide some material to orientthe reader to our assumptions and point of view, fol-lowed by additional examples of dialogs and then a briefdiscussion of Heim's rules for handling context changeand accommodation.2 OrientationHere we briey note some of our background assump-tions and terminology.1. As a discourse unfolds, the participants' under-standings of what is being conveyed grow (and per-haps also shrink). The understanding by a givenparticipant of what is being conveyed is the (chang-ing) context discourse (for that participant).2. We represent the discourse context as an n-tuple ofrst order formulae. It represents what one personaccepts the discourse to be saying. We do not treatpresumed background beliefs (for now).3. In the rather simple discourses we discuss, rhetor-ical relations are always signaled explicitly by oc-currences of the words: `the', `but', `because', `if',`then', `so'. We will show how an active-logic rea-soner can use knowledge of these relations to makeboth tentative and ultimate decisions about how toupdate the discourse context.4. Natural language presupposition and cancellation ofpresupposition is one place where the avoidance ofcontradiction plays a role (that is, it plays a rolein the theoretical discussion of presupposition). Wetherefore take as our rst material such presupposi-tional discourses. But (as we will show) our treat-ment of contradiction diers from the norm. Wethink the appearance of contradiction is somethingto be reasoned about|for often there is more thanone way to remove a contradiction and there is morethan one way to proceed after such removal. Activelogic facilitates reasoning about (and in the presenceof) contradictions.5. We have chosen to implement a (modied) versionof Heim's rules for updating discourse context (theContext Change Potential (CCP) Rules). Our rea-sons are:(a) These rules explicitly represent context (al-though as semantic items). And active logicis a system that (typically) operates on explicitrepresentations.
(b) The CCP rules seem to explain some pre-supposition phenomena correctly in terms ofanaphoric structure of the discourse. ThusHeim's system gets some things right that thenotable alternatives (deriving fromGazdar) getwrong. And we believe that we can build a sys-tem that will ultimately get all of these contextupdating phenomena right.6. In our thinking about these problems we and oth-ers (see Heim, etc.) have often selected for studya few simple but rather unnatural discourses. Theassumption was that pragmatic phenomena like pre-supposition can be accounted for using a few sim-ple relations between, say, pairs of sentences. Oncethese relations were found and formalized, perhapswe could generalize to more complex, more natu-ral discourses. In this paper we set that workinghypothesis aside:(a) we will show that there are slightly more com-plex discourses that may not be generalizablefrom the simple ones;(b) we propose that these (and therefore the oth-ers) must be understood by appeal to some-what more complex and variable forms of rea-soning, involving, for example, local rhetoricalrelations, along with consistency criteria.3 More ExamplesThe presupposition phenomena we will discuss occur inthe following discourses.D1 = h There are roses and tulips. But the roses arenot yellow. iD2 = h There is no king. So the king is not in hiding.i D3 = h If John has a son, then his son is not here. iD4 = h If I discover that Bill is in New York there willbe trouble. iD5 = h The King is not in hiding, Because there is noking. iD6 = h There are no roses. So the roses are not in thefridge. iD7 = h The roses are not in the fridge. Because thereare no roses. iIt is clear that presuppositional behavior is complex|even for relatively simple discourses. Apparently certainsyntactic forms (such as the denite description `Theroses') give rise to a presupposition (`There are roses')which may or may not produce a presupposition in thetotal discourse.22For our purposes here we will only work with exampleswhere presupposition is caused by the use of a denite de-scription. We assume that what we say could also be said forsome other sources of presupposition, including factive verbsas in D4, possessives as in D3 and cleft sentences.
We call D5 (where \There is a king" is rst addedto the discourse context only to be later withdrawn) a\garden path discourse". These are often ignored by the-orists, who may be assuming that if we could just get theusual or normal sorts of (monotonically increasing) dis-course right then perhaps we could go on to tackle thoseother ones. We believe that this divide-and-conquer ap-proach may be misguided, that garden path problemscan already be found in so-called normal discourses.4 Heim's CCP RulesA partial function + takes a discourse context c followedby an utterance u into a new context c0. Although wehave no rigorous specication of what makes up a dis-course context we can say that it should include thepropositional content of what is mutually accepted bythe discourse participants. For discourse D1 above, theoriginal context would rst be updated by processing u1,the rst utterance.c1 + There are roses and tulips = c2.Presumably c2 would entail that there are roses andthat there are tulips. Next c2 would be updated to c3after processing u2, \But the roses are not yellow."The function + is subject to the restriction that c +u is undened unless c is a subset of (that is, entails)every presupposition of u. Thus the context for an ut-terance must entail all presuppositions of the utterance.We can interpret propositions as sets of possible worlds,while the utterances that give rise to and aect thesepropositions are tokens of natural language.Much of the presupposition data, including the dis-courses D1 through D3, are predicted by Heim's threerules of context updating, the CCPs to which we haveadded a basis rule CCPB.CCPA: c + (u and v) = (c + u) + v. [conjunction]CCPN: c + (not u) = c n (c + u).3 [negation]CCPC: c + (if u then v) = cn ((c + u) n ((c +u) +v)). [conditional]CCPB: c + u = c \ [[u]]. [atomic basis]The rst three rules are rewrite rules for complex ut-terances. Repeated application of these rules will reducea complex utterance to a formula containing atomic ut-terances where rule CCPB can be applied.Rule CCPN is an analog of a rule for logical conjunc-tion [[P ^: Q]] = [[P]] n [[Q]]. In eect, Heim can beassumed to be proposing that, for discourse updatingwhere the utterance is a negation, not u, we do thefollowing: (i) Start with c and then imagine that thediscourse had been u (the positive form) rather thannot u| but in the same context. Next (ii) subtractthe proposition that this imagined discourse would yieldas its updated context from the original, real context.Heim allows contradictions to both appear and persist3In general, pnq is the set theoretic intersection of p withthe complement of q, i.e., the subtraction of q from p.
in the imagined discourse (that is, the context that willbe subtracted). On this point we disagree with Heim.It happens that for some (but not all) discourses thisgives the wrong result. We will show that when theCCP rules are modied and used as rules of active logicthey can reasonably lead ultimately to updated contextswhere contradictions have been removed and all the cor-rect presuppositions are retained.In the basis rule CCPB, when c + [[u]] is dened thenew context is simply c \ [[u]],4 where [[u]] is the propo-sition expressed by the utterance u. In many cases c \[[u]] gives the empirically correct result. We will arguebelow that in other cases it gives a wrong result. Thenwe will propose a more realistic interpretation of +. Thiswill be our chief modication to the theory.5 AccommodationContext updating becomes interesting when we considerdiscourses where c + u is undened but where things canbe made right through accommodation. For example,assumec = [[Grass is green]]5D = h The roses are yellow. iAccording to the applicable rule CCPB, c + u wouldbe infelicitous because c does not entail [[There areroses]] which is the presupposition of D. But it seemsthat the understander can easily accommodate to get c0= c \ [[There are roses]], thus making c0 + u felicitous.We therefore allow this kind of accommodation whenrequired in the application of the CCP rules.We begin to encounter diculties with the simple pic-ture of accommodation in certain discourses involvingnegative existentials. In D2, u1 produces a context cwhich entails [[There is no king]]. The next sentence isu2 = h The king is not in hiding. iThe applicable rule for this discourse is CCPN:c + not (x is the king and x is in hiding) = cn((c + xis the king) + x is in hiding).6Here accommodation is required because the rst +operation to the right of the back slash is not dened; cdoes not entail the presupposition [[There is a king]]. Ifwe accommodate as in the previous discourse we wouldadd [[There is a king]] to c on the left hand side. Wewould then proceed to develop the right hand side wherec0 replaces c. However this would yield a contradictionin the nal updated context. Heim suggests using localaccommodationwhich operates only on c in the imagineddiscourse to the right of the back slash. This producesthe correct result. However everything to the right of the4Assumed by Soames [Soames, 1989] and explicitly statedby Heim [Heim, 1992] as well as by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet [Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 1990]5We choose [[Grass is green]] as a stand in for a contextthat is irrelevant to the discourse.6We follow Heim by using free variable syntactic forms ofsentences
back slash becomes inconsistent. This does no harm inthis case, leaving, of course, c as the nal context. Butwe have been asked to imagine a discourse that beginswith and stays with a contradiction.Notice that D5 is a variant of D2 and is equally welltreated a la Heim. But D6 which resembles D5, encoun-ters a severe diculty.c1 = [[Grass is green]]D6 = h There are no roses. So the roses are not in thefridge iWe think that a speaker of this discourse could reason-ably be taken to be asserting that there are no roses whilealso presupposing that there is a fridge. So there mustbe some manner of accommodation of the presupposi-tion that there is a fridge (at utterance u2). But neitherglobal nor local accommodation will produce the correctcontext updating for this seemingly straightforward andsimple discourse. Global accommodation yields a selfcontradictory interpretation of the discourse. On theother hand, local accommodation yields a consistent in-terpretation (as desired) but one that is missing the pre-supposition that there is a fridge. The applicable rule isCCPN. Local accommodation proceeds by rst adding[[There are roses]] to the occurrence of c2 in the imag-ined discourse to the right of the back slash as shownbelow.c3 = c2n(((c2 \ [[There are roses]] + x are the roses)+ y is the fridge) + in(x, y))The trouble with this is that c2 already entails [[Thereare no roses]] from the processing of u1. Thus the contextc2 \ [[There are roses]] we get by accommodation is itselfcontradictory and so all further + operations are \felic-itous" | according to Heim's denition of +.7 Thusthe nal context in the imagined discourse (everythingto the right of the back slash) is simply the null context,a contradiction. This leaves c2 as the nal context forthe total discourse. But c2 is simply the context as itstood after u1; the presupposition that there is a fridgenever makes it into the discourse context.8And what ismore, there are no signals that there is anything wrong.Our diagnosis will be that something is wrong with theway we have been accommodating presuppositions. Inactive logic, we can add presuppositions (accomodatethem) and later reason about whether they should bewithdrawn. Thus where Heim's (and other presuppo-sition theories) seem to deal with nonmonotonicity indiscourse, in fact, they only allow a context to changemonotonically (once the decision has been made to ac-comodate)7If a context is contradictory, it will, of course entail anypresupposition of any utterance. So c + u will always bedened, that is, felicitous.8The variant D7 is similarly problematic: global accomo-dation leaves an inconsistent context, while local accomoda-tion retains both the presuppositions that there is a fridgeand that there are roses.
6 Our ProposalElsewhere (Gurney and Morreau [Gurney and Morreau,1995]) we propose a solution to the above problem thatdoes without the global/local distinction. It requiresthat a context be intersected with a maximal consistentsubset of the set of potential presuppositions of u. Herewe would like to consider a more far reaching and po-tentially more fruitful solution. This will require twocommitments: (a) The CCP rules should be taken ascriteria that constrain manipulation of discourse repre-sentations. If, for example, we use a version of DiscourseRepresentation Theory [Kamp and Reyle, 1993] then theCCP rules can be made into constraints on how to usethe DRS construction rules. All the manipulation is per-formed here; none on the CCP rules. For example CCPNwould call for constructing an imaginary DRS, then per-haps negating that to form a condition in the main DRS.(b) The three CCP rewrite rules remain unchanged. Andthe form of the basis rule CCPB remains but with a moreliberal interpretation of the partial function +.Until now we have presumed that, when dened, therule CCPB prescribes (possible world) set intersection,c + u = c \ [[u]]. Henceforth we will allow that c +u can be felicitously performed in ways other than this.For a start we will say that c + u should result in thebest possible new context. In many cases intersectionof c with [[u]] is the best possible new context. But inothers including \garden path" discourses likeD5 as wellas "rejection" dialogues likeD8 = h Sam: There is no king here, Sally: But I justsaw the king on TV iintersection is not the best policy. In D5 at u2 the pre-supposition that there is a king should be withdrawnfrom the current context. And in D7 Sally is attemptingto at least get [[There is no king]] withdrawn and perhapsalso get [[There is a king]] added to the context. Theseare some of the variations in context updating allowedby our new theory of +. This is still a partial function,however, which still enforces felicity as regards presup-position. We will now illustrate CCPN and CCPB inaction| rst with a rather simple case. Let c1 entailthat nothing is both red and green. Thenc1 + h Grass is green, Grass is not red ihas a felicitous normal (consistent) interpretation. Firstapply CCPB to process u1 to get c2 which entails thatgrass is green. Next apply CCPN to process u2:c2 + hGrass is not redi = c2 n (c2 + hGrass is redi).On the old interpretation of + we get a contradictionto the right of the back slash, leaving c2 (which sim-ply entails [[Grass is green]] as well as [[Nothing is bothred and green]]) as the nal context c3. This may bethe most natural correct nal result. But on the newinterpretation of + there are other possibilities for c2 +hGrass is redi in the imagined discourse. Treating this asa possible discourse in itself, one should want to achievea best result, something other than a contradiction. We
can either remove [[Grass is green]] from c2 or simplyreject [[Grass is red]]. The latter would make the totaldiscourse a contradiction, not a good result. The formerwould in this case yield the same result as the old way.So we see that allowing contradictions to appear on theright of the back slash is not necessary. There is anotherway that produces the same result but also is potentiallymore fruitful.Similar strategies allow us to use the CCP rules to ac-count for the troublesome D6, as well as the garden pathdiscourse D5. Perhaps D4 and others involving conver-sational implicature can also be accounted for using therevised + function. Several of our examples use `so',`because', and other rhetorical clue words. This infor-mation should also be applied in the decision to nd thebest possible update c + u.If the structures of DRT are used to represent the dis-course, then the CCP rules should be taken as principlesthat govern legal manipulations of the DRSs. We wouldlike to regard the CCP rules in some way analogously tothe semantic criterion for a valid rule of inference. Thelatter states that an inference rule must preserve truth,that it be impossible to generate a false conclusion fromtrue premisses. But our discourse rules are more com-plex. They do place some restrictions on whatever al-gorithms or heuristics one uses to interpret a series ofutterances in a discourse.It is our view that dialog-understanding is best seenas on ongoing form of reasoning in which conclusionsare reached and (perhaps) later relinquished in light ofadditional information. This is more than plain-and-simple nonmonotonicity, for we have in mind that thereis no static theory (set of axioms) valid for even a singlesentence of a discourse. Rather, the reasoning that sup-ports discourse-understanding constantly evolves, con-stantly re-assesses its own conclusions, that the contextis constantly changing (at least with each new word ut-tered). This is the basis for our hope that active logicmay provide a useful basis for the formalization of theabove ideas.Thus, in D5 above it may rst be inferred that thereis a king because nothing in the dialog so far (i.e., in thecurrent context) rules out that potential presupposition,even though a few seconds later the evolving dialog mayprovide a new context that does rule this out. It is crucialto this approach that the belief set (set of conclusions)is at every moment nite, consisting of what has beenproven (and not rejected) up til now, where the notionof now is indexed to a clock that advances as reasoning(and dialog) proceeds.7 Applying Active Logic to DiscourseActive logic has generally been used to represent the be-liefs of an agent at a given step (normally a given time).It is assumed that a nite set of FOPC like formulaecan represent this belief state. A change in the belief
state of the agent yields a new step, that is, a new setof formulae. In this paper we will adapt active logic forthe purpose of understanding discourse. For this we willbe concerned primarily with formulae that represent thediscourse context, that is, the record of what has beensaid up to the current step. At step n the informationstate (context, etc.) might look something likeStep n: ctxt([:::], n)[:::] is an ordered list of the agent's model of the dis-course context.Although some of the agent's other beliefs will nor-mally change as the discourse unfolds we will ignore thispossibility and only represent beliefs about the discoursein our examples.Here we introduce the predicates and rules used in ouractive logic.7.1 Predicates used.1. now(t) indicates that we are now at the tth step ofcomputation.2. ctxt(c, t) represents that the context at time t con-sists of the list c of formulae.3. ut('X', t) represents thatX has been uttered at timet.4. parse(X, t) is the parse obtained at time t by pro-cessing an utterance at the previous step.5. dfnt(X) represents a denite description in the ut-terance. (This is produced by the parser).6. update(X, t) represents at time t, elements of thediscourse that still need to be incorporated into thecontext according to Heim's rules. X is a list ofcontexts, atoms from the inputs and the + and noperators. In the subsequent presentation of rulesand active logic steps, + will be denoted as PLUS,and n as SLASH.7. presup(X) marks X as a presupposition in the con-text.8. exists(x, P(x)) indicates that an object with prop-erty P exists in the discourse context.99. assert(X) marks X as having been asserted in anutterance.10. contra(X, Y, t) indicates that there is a contradic-tion between the formulae X and Y in the contextat time t   1.11. NULL(X) indicates that formula X is not to be\trusted".12. SUSPECT(X) indicates that formula X has givenrise to a contradiction.9Our use of \exists" here is not the usual logical use withnarrow scope. Rather, it has wider scope as used in DRT andby Heim.
7.2 Rules of inference used.The rules will be presented in the form:i: Xi+1: YIf X is believed at step i, then Y is added to the beliefsat step i+1. Nothing else is added to the beliefs that isnot mentioned by these rules.1. i: ut('X', i)i+1: parse(Y, i+1)where Y is a parse of X.2. i: ctxt(C, i) parse(X, i)i+1: update(Z, i+1)Z is a list of operators and operands such that suc-cessively applying the operators to their operandsresults in updating the context with the parsed in-put utterance according to Heim's rules (CCPA,CCPN, CCPC).3. i: update(X, i)i+1: update(Y, i+1)where Y is the result of applying the rst operator(PLUS or SLASH) in the list Y to its arguments.There are several cases depending on the operatorand on the form of the operands. These are notdetailed here for brevity.4. i: update(X, i)i+1: ctxt(X, i+1)this rule is a subcase of the previous and is appliedwhen all context updating is complete for one par-ticular utterance. Once the update is complete, thenew context is put back into the set of beliefs of thesystem.5. i: ctxt([:::, foo(X), :::, bar(not(Y)), :::], i)i+1: ctxt([:::, SUSPECT(foo(X), :::,SUSPECT(bar(not(Y))), :::,contra(foo(X), bar(not(Y)))], i+1)This rule detects direct contradictions in the con-text. Here, X and Y are uniable and foo and barare either assert or presup. Note that foo(X) andbar(not(X)) are tagged as being \suspect" at i+1.6. i: ctxt([:::, SUSPECT(foo(X), :::,SUSPECT(bar(not(Y))), :::,contra(foo(X), bar(not(Y)))], i+1)i+1: ctxt(Z, i+1)Z is the context resulting from resolving the con-tradiction agged at step i. The contradiction canbe resolved by using various additional sources ofinformation including:1010See Miller [Miller, 1992] for more on contradiction reso-lution in active logic
 Other elements in the context, for examplerhetorical relations, formulae in the context rel-evant to the contradictands, the sequence of in-ferences leading to the derivation of the contra-dictands. General knowledge which may be outside thecontext (though we do not treat this here). The status of the contradictands| whetherthey are assertions, presuppositions or dis-trusted.Resolving the contradiction can result in one orboth of the formulae being distrusted, and in furtherchanges in the context. Note that the resolution ofa contradiction is itself defeasible|this resolutioncould later lead to other contradictions which couldundo the changes done at this point.7. i: ctxt(X, i)i+1: ctxt(X, i+1)We simply inherit the context to the next step ifthere is no change.8. i: ctxt(X, i), ctxt(Y, i)i+1: ctxt(X [ Y, i+1)Note that taking the union of the 2 contexts couldintroduce contradictions in the total context. Thatwill be detected at the next step.9. i: now(i)i+1: now(i+1)This is the \clock rule". Time does not stand stillwhile we are reasoning.8 Steps GaloreWe consider only discourses that depend on `but', `so',`because', overtly. We will treat them as intersententialrelevance markers.The rst exampleWe now present our rst example.11D1 = hThere are roses and tulips. But the roses arenot yellowiStep0 ctxt( [], 0),ut( 'There are roses and tulips')Let c1 = [].121 c1, parse(and(exists(x,R(x)),exists(y,T( y))))This is the result of parsing the utterance and inher-iting the previous context.2 c1, update([c1,exists(x,R(x)),PLUS,exists(y,T(y)),PLUS])11Some details are not shown, for example the argumentrepresenting time in the predicates.12We will use ci for both the list of formulae in the con-text and for the predicat ctxt(ci, j). Which is meant will beevident from the context.
update is the result of applying Heim's rules recur-sively to the parsed utterance. Note that this is in post-x form, however.3 c1, update([c2,exists(y,T(y)),PLUS])where c2 = [assert(exists(x,R(x)))]The rst operation is (c1,exists(x,R(x)),PLUS). Wejust assert the new atom into the context.4 c1,update(c3)where c3 = c2 [ assert(exists(y,T(y)))We assert the second part of the utterance into thecontext too....7 c3At the end of processing the rst utterance, the con-text contains the assertions that there are both rosesand tulips in the discourse context. We now add thenext utterance.8 c3, ut('But the roses are not yellow')9 c3, parse(and(but,not(and(dfnt(R(z)),Y( z)))))The new utterance has been parsed and we now needto incorporate it into the context.10 c3, update(c3,but,PLUS,c3,but,PLUS,dfnt(R(z)),PLUS,Y(z), PLUS, SLASH])...12 c3,update(c4,c4,dfnt(R(z)),PLUS,Y(z),PLUS,SLASH])where c4 = c3 [ assert(but)Now we have to add \the roses" to the context. Wesearch in the context for roses that were previously men-tioned the closest to the present time|i.e., a mention ofroses closest to the tail of the list.13 c3,update(c4,c5,Y(z),PLUS,SLASH)where c5 = c4 [ assert(x=z)We have in fact mentioned roses before, and we makethe new mention of roses designate the same roses as theprevious mention by asserting x=z.14 c3, update(c4, c6,SLASH)where c6 = c5 [ Y(z)15 c3, update(c4 [ not(and(assert(x=z),assert(Y(z))))Set dierence between the two contexts is done byadding to the rst context the negation of the elementsin the second context but not in the rst.Here we have a choice of what to negate: either thatx=z or that z are yellow, or both. It is at this point thatwe make appeal to rhetorical information in but to helpus make the best choice. If we make the right choice here,which seems to be not to doubt that the roses mentionedin the second utterance are the same roses mentioned inthe rst, we get eventually:
ctxt([assert(exists(x,R(x))),assert(exists(y,T(y))),assert(but),not(and(assert(x=z),assert(Y(z))),assert(not(Y(z))),assert(x=z).We could of course have made a bad choice here. Hadthat happened, it could have led to a contradiction lateron in the discourse and the choice we made at this pointwould then be questioned.A second exampleWe now show an example of active logic using therules and predicates discussed above to a garden pathsentence. This is essentially D7.D9 = hJohn bought owers, [Are the roses in thefridge?], No, (the roses are not in the fridge), Becausethere were no rosesiHere we have a case where something is rst addedto the discourse context only to be promptly removed.As presented in [Heim, 1983], the CCP rules cannotdeal with this discourse. The last sentence would simplyproduce a null set of possible worlds, making anythingthat followed "felicitous."To save space we will consider only the shortened dis-course D7:D7 = hThe roses are not in the fridge. Because thereare no roses.iStep0 ctxt( [],0) ut( 'The roses are not in the fridge')Let c1 = [].1 c1, parse(not(and(dfnt(R(x)),dfnt(F(y)),in(x, y))))This is the result of parsing the utterance and inher-iting the previous context.2 c1, update([c1, c1,dfnt(R(x)),PLUS,dfnt(F(y)),PLUS, in( x,y), PLUS, SLASH])We get the update predicate by applying Heim's rulesas before.3 c1, update([c2,c2,dfnt(F(y)),PLUS,in( x,y),PLUS,SLASH])where c2 = [presup(exists(x,R(x)))]The rst operation is (c2, dfnt(F(y)), PLUS). Since wehave a denite descriptor, we rst search the previouscontext (c1) for a previous mention of roses. As thereis none, we accomodate (globally) the context with thepresupposition that there are roses.4 c1, update([c3, c3,in(x,y),PLUS,SLASH])where c3= [presup(exists(x,R(x))),presup(exists(y,F(y)))]Similarly, we accomodate by adding the presupposi-tion that there is a fridge to our context.5 c1, update([c3, c3 [ [assert(in(x,y))],SLASH]We simply assert that the roses are in the fridge. Notethat here, only one context is being updated. We do notadd the new assertion globally.
6 c1, update([c3 [ [not(assert(in(x,y)))]])...11 c4, ut('Because there are no roses')where c4= c3 [ [not(assert(in(x,y)))]= [presup(exists(x,R(x))),presup(exists(y,F(y)))assert(not(in( x, y)))])After some processing, we end up with a new contextthat contains the presuppositions that there are rosesand a fridge and that the roses are in the fridge. To thisnew context, the second utterance is added.12 c4,parse(and(because,not(exists(z,R(z)))))We repeat the processing we did above.13 c4, update(c4,because,PLUS,c4,because,PLUS,exists(Z,R(z)),PLUS,SLASH)...17 c4, update(c5)where c5= c4 [ [assert(because),not(assert(exists(z,R(z))))]We have asserted \because" in the context because\because" can serve as a clue to picking the right choiceamong several alternatives we could encounter in laterprocessing....21 ctxt([presup(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),asssert(not(in(x,y))),assert(because),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))We now have a context which presupposes that thereare roses and which asserts that there are none.22 ctxt([SUSPECT(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),asssert(not(in(x,y))),assert(because),SUSPECT(not(exists(z,R(z))))contra(presup(exists(x,R(x))),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))]That contradiction is detected and agged. The for-mulae that caused the contradiction appear at this stepagged as being \suspect".23 ctxt([NULL(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),asssert(not(in(x,y))),assert(because),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))Using the fact that one of the contradictands was apresupposition and the other an assertion we concludethat we were mistaken about the presupposition. Thisis not always the right decision but it is a good heuris-tic. We make the presupposition that roses exist to besuspect and we reinstate the assertion that roses do notexist (in the discourse context).
24 ctxt([NULL(exists(x,R(x))),presup(y,F(y)),asssert(NULL(in(x,y))),assert(because),assert(not(exists(z,R(z))))Since we doubt the existence of roses, we doubt thetruthfulness of the statement that the roses are in thefridge.At the end of processing D7, we \know" the following: There is a fridge. There are no roses.And we have doubts about the following: There are roses. The roses are in the fridge.And this is what we expect to get.9 ConclusionIn conclusion, we have shown that active logic can beapplied to the problem of updating according to the +function in Heim's system of rules for discourse context.Heim's rules account for certain e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